We present a novel construction, drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in any resource selection game, the indifference of all players among Nash equilibria in such games, and the invariance of the load on each given resource across all Nash equilibria. The existence proof allows for explicit calculation of a Nash equilibrium and for explicit and direct calculation of the resulting (invariant) loads on resources, and does not hinge on any fixed-point theorem, on the Minimax Theorem or any equivalent result, or on the existence of a potential.
Notation
Definition 1 (Notation).
• (Naturals). We denote the natural numbers by N {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
• ([n]). For every n ∈ N, we define [n] {1, . . . , n}.
• (Reals). We denote the real numbers by R.
• (Nonnegative Reals). We denote the nonnegative reals by R ≥ {r ∈ R | r ≥ 0}.
• (Maximizing Arguments). Given a set S and a function f : S → R that attains a maximum value on S, we denote the set of arguments in S maximizing f by arg Max s∈S f (s) {s ∈ S | f (s) = m}, where m Max s∈S f (s).
• (Simplex). For a set R ⊆ S, we define
(The set S will be clear from context.)
• (Nonempty Subsets). For a set S, we define 2 S =∅ 2 S \ ∅ -the nonempty subsets of S.
Definition 2 (Plateau Height). Let f : R → R be a nondecreasing function. We say that h ∈ R is a plateau height of f if there exist x = y ∈ R s.t. f (x) = f (y) = h.
Setting
Definition 3 (Resource Selection). Let n ∈ N. An n-resource selection game is defined by a pair (f j ) n j=1 ; (µ R ) R∈2
[n] =∅
, where f j : R ≥ → R is a nondecreasing function for every j ∈ [n], and µ R ∈ R ≥ for every nonempty subset R of [n] .
In a resource selection game, each R ∈ 2
[n]
=∅ indicates a player type, which may consume only from the resources in R; µ R is the amount to be consumed by all players of type R (one may imagine a continuum of such players, with total mass µ R ). For each resource j ∈ [n], f j is a function from the consumption amount of this resource to the consumption cost per resource unit. We now formally define these concepts.
Definition 4 (Consumption Profile/Nash Equilibrium). Let G = (f j ) n j=1 ; (µ R ) R∈2
[n] =∅ be a resource selection game.
1. A consumption (strategy) profile in G is a function s : 2
≥ s.t. s(R) ∈ µ R · ∆ R for every R ∈ 2
[n] =∅ .
2. Given a consumption profile s in G, we define µ s j R∈2
[n] =∅ s j (R) for every j ∈ [n] -the load on (i.e. total consumption from) resource j. Furthermore, we define h s j f j (µ s j ).
3. A Nash equilibrium in G is a consumption profile s s.t. for every R ∈ 2
[n] =∅ , h s k ≤ h s j for every k ∈ supp s(R) and j ∈ R.
Example 1 (Home Internet / Cellular Market). Consider a scenario in which the resources are internet service providers (ISPs), and the players are customers on the market for home internet. (Alternatively, one could think of resources as cellular operators, and of players as customers on the market for cellular service.) Each customer may choose between the providers available in this customer's geographical area, and would like to get a connection with the largest bandwidth possible given this constraint. µ R in this case is proportional to the amount of customers with possible ISPs R, and for each j ∈ [n], we choose f j s.t. h s j = f j (µ s j ) is inversely proportional to the effective bandwidth for each subscriber of ISP j, when there are µ s j subscribers to this ISP. If each ISP has the same total (i.e. overall) bandwidth, then the speed of the connection of a single customer subscribed to an ISP is inversely proportional to this ISP's number of subscribers, and so obtaining the fastest connection possible is equivalent to subscribing to a least-subscribed-to ISP, and so this case is captured by setting f j id for every j ∈ [n]. Generalizing, we may imagine that e.g. some ISPs may have different total bandwidths than others (which may be captured by setting f j (x) x /b j , where b j is the total bandwidth of ISP j), or that some ISPs may even purchase some additional total bandwidth as their subscriber pool grows; in either scenario, in order to surf with greatest speed, each customer would prefer to subscribe not necessarily to a least-subscribed-to ISP (i.e. one with minimal µ s j ), but rather to an ISP from whom the customer would receive the fastest connection, i.e. one with minimal h s j = f j (µ s j ). The study of stability against group deviations was initiated by Aumann (1959) , who considers deviations from which all deviators gain. Recently, the CS literature considers a considerably-stronger solution concept, according to which a deviation is considered beneficial even if only some of the participants in the deviating coalition gain, as long as none of the participants lose (see e.g. Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz (2006) ). While stability against the classical all-gaining coalitional deviation is termed strong equilibrium, this more-demanding concept is referred to as super-strong equilibrium; there are very few results showing its existence in nontrivial settings. We now formally define both concepts.
Definition 5 (Strong / Super-Strong Nash Equilibrium). Let G = (f j ) n j=1 ; (µ R ) R∈2
[n] =∅ be a resource selection game and let s be a Nash equilibrium in G. For every R ∈ 2
=∅ with µ R > 0, let h R h s j for every j ∈ supp s(R) . (h R is well defined by definition of Nash equilibrium.)
• s is a strong Nash equilibrium if there exist no coalition T ⊆ 2
=∅ and consumption profile s ′ = s s.t. s ′ | 2
[n] =∅ \T = s| 2
[n] =∅ \T and s.t. h s ′ k < h R for every R ∈ T and k ∈ supp s ′ (R) s.t. s ′ k (R) > s k (R).
• s is a super-strong Nash equilibrium if there exist no coalition T ⊆ 2
=∅ and consumption profile s ′ s.t. s ′ | 2
[n] =∅ \T and s.t. h s ′ k ≤ h R for every R ∈ T and k ∈ supp s ′ (R) , with a strict inequality for at least one such pair (R, k).
Remark 1. Every super-strong Nash equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium.
3 Resource Selection via One-Way Communicating Vessels -A Special Case Gonczarowski and Tennenholtz (2014) give a constructive proof for the very special case in which µ R > 0 only for player types R of the form [k] for some k ∈ [n] (i.e. µ R = 0 for every R not of this form); their proof draws its intuition from an analogy to a system of communicating vessels -see Fig. 1 . We note that Kaminsky (2000) , in turn, uses an analogy to quite a different system of communicating vessels to solve rationing problems; his motivation is quite different, and involves extending bilateral rationing rules. While Kaminsky uses a set of two-way communicating vessels, Gonczarowski and Tennenholtz use a set of one-way communicating vessels. In this context, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium among players may be regarded as a rationing problem with constraints. The treatment of Gonczarowski and Tennenholtz (2014) also sheds new light on rationing problems, as resource selection games of sorts among a continuum of good-fragments.
Formal Results
Our goal is to constructively prove the following three theorems and corollary.
Theorem 1 (∃ Nash Equilibrium). Let G = (f j ) n j=1 ; (µ R ) R∈2
If f 1 , . . . , f n are continuous, then a Nash equilibrium exists in G.
Theorem 2 (Resource Costs are Independent of Nash Equilibrium). Let G be an n-resource selection game. h s j = h s ′ j for every j ∈ [n] and every two Nash equilibria s, s ′ in G.
be a resource selection game.
(Players are Indifferent between Nash Equilibria
=∅ and every two Nash equilibria s, s ′ in G.
2. (Resource Loads are Independent of Nash Equilibrium). If no two of (f j ) n j=1 share any plateau height, then µ s j = µ s ′ j for every j ∈ [n] and every two Nash equilibria s, s ′ in G. (f) Pouring µ [5] liquid into the fifth vessel. Some of the liquid penetrates into the fourth vessel, and later into the third and second vessels, so that no vessel has lower surface level than any vessel on its right. Figure 1 : Illustration of the special-case construction of Gonczarowski and Tennenholtz (2014) , for n = 5 and for f j = id for every j ∈ [5]. E.g. as exactly 80% of the blue liquid in Fig. 1(f) is in the third vessel and the remaining 20% is in the second one, the strategy for player type [3] in the Nash equilibrium that they construct is 0.8 · µ [3] consumption from resource 3 and 0.2 · µ [3] consumption from resource 2.
Theorem 3 (All Nash Equilibria are Strong / Super Strong). Let G = (f j ) n j=1 ; (µ R ) R∈2
1. All Nash equilibria in G are strong.
2. If h s j is not a plateau height of f j for each j ∈ [n] in any/every Nash equilibrium s, then all Nash equilibria in G are super strong.
We emphasize that our proof of Theorem 1 allows for explicit calculation of a Nash equilibrium, and does not hinge on any fixed-point theorem, on the Minimax Theorem or any equivalent result, or on the existence of a potential. Furthermore, our proof of Theorem 2 gives an explicit formula for h s j for every j ∈ [n].
Construction and Hydraulic Intuition
In this section, we intuitively survey the construction underlying our results, as a prelude to the formal analysis given in Section 6. We start with the special case in which f j = id for every j ∈ [n], i.e. h s j = µ s j for every j ∈ [n] and consumption profile s. Our "hydraulic" construction for this case, from which our analysis draws intuition, is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The intuition underlying our results draws from a number of key observations regarding this construction (we generalize and formalize these observations in Section 6):
1. If the pistons in a set S (e.g. S = {1, 3} or S = {4}) of containers stop simultaneously, then at the time of their stopping, no liquid under these pistons can escape to any container in which the piston has not yet stopped (or else it would do so and the piston above it would not stop).
2. By Observation 1, and as pistons that stop later in time stop at a lower height, in the resulting consumption profile no player type has any incentive to deviate, and so it is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
3. If we initially distribute the liquid of each "colour" (among the various balloons corresponding to this colour) according to some Nash equilibrium (e.g. if we initially distribute the liquid as in Fig. 2(f) ), then the liquid distribution would not change during the entire process of descent of the pistons. Therefore, each Nash equilibrium may be attained from some initial liquid distribution.
4. After the first and third pistons (in Fig. 2 ) stop, we effectively start over, solving a 3-resource (2, 4, 5) selection game among all player types whose original acceptable resources were not merely the first and/or third resource.
5. Per Observation 1 above, no part of the liquid under the first and third pistons (in Fig. 2 ) when they stop can ever end up in any container other than these two, regardless of the initial liquid distribution. Therefore, the first and third pistons always stop having under them at least the liquid that is under them in Fig. 2(d) , and therefore at this or a higher height. Per the same observation, the pistons stopping first always stop having under them solely liquid that cannot escape to other containers, and so if this set were not the first and third pistons, then it would stop below the stopping height of the first and third pistons, regardless of the initial liquid distribution. Therefore, the first and third pistons always stop first, and at the same height. Using Observation 4, an inductive argument can show that the height at which each piston stops (and the stopping order) is independent of the initial liquid distribution, and so by Observation 3, h s j for every j ∈ [n] is independent (a) A set of 5 open-top hollow box containers, corresponding, from left to right, to resources 1, . . . , 5 respectively. For each player type R with µ R > 0 (each such type is assigned a distinct colour in the illustration), a balloon, or plastic bag, is placed in each container j ∈ R. Balloons corresponding to the same type R are connected via a thin tube emerging from a narrow slit (not shown) running vertically along the back of each container, and are jointly filled with µ R liquid.
(b) Pistons are simultaneously lowered through the top sides of all container. As the piston in the first container reaches the balloons in this container, they are compressed, causing the balloons connected to them (i.e. the purple balloon in the third container, the blue balloons in the third and fourth containers, and the cyan balloons in the second, third and fifth containers) to inflate.
(c) As the piston in the third container reaches the balloons in this container, they start to compress as well, causing e.g. the interconnected blue balloon in the fourth container to inflate even faster.
(d) At a certain point in time, no balloon in the first or third containers can be compressed any further, as all the liquid in these containers that could have escaped to other containers has been depleted. The pistons in the first and third containers halt, and the remaining pistons continue their descent.
(e) At some later point in time, no balloon in the fourth container can be compressed any further, as all the liquid in this container that could have escaped to any container other than the first or the third ones has been depleted.
(f) Eventually, no balloon in the second or fifth container can be compressed any further, and the process concludes.
Figure 2: Illustration of the construction underlying our analysis, for n = 5 and for f j = id for every j ∈ [5]. E.g. as exactly 87.5% of the red liquid in Fig. 2 (f) is in the second container and the remaining 12.5% is in the fifth one, the strategy for the player type corresponding to the red colour (i.e. R = {2, 5}) in the (super-)strong Nash equilibrium that we construct is 0.875·µ {2,5} consumption from resource 2 and 0.125·µ {2,5} consumption from resource 5; similarly, as all of the blue liquid is in the fourth container, the strategy for the "blue" type ({1, 3, 4}) in this equilibrium is µ {1,3,4} consumption, solely from resource 2.
of the choice of Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, by the same argument, a player who consumes from more than one resource always consumes from resources with the same h s j , independently of the choice of Nash equilibrium s.
We note that while the final piston heights (i.e. values of h s j ) are independent of the initial distribution of liquid among connected balloons (i.e. of the choice of Nash equilibrium s), the final liquid distribution (i.e. player strategies) is not; e.g. in Fig. 2(f) , any amount of cyan liquid may be transferred from the second to the fifth container "in exchange for" an identical amount of red liquid.
For the general case of arbitrary f j , we intuitively think of replacing the j'th box container, for every j ∈ [n], with a container shaped so that whenever it is filled with any amount µ j ∈ R ≥ of liquid, the resulting surface level would be precisely f j (µ j ). See Fig. 3 for an illustration. We emphasize that while the actual construction of such vessels requires differentiability of the functions f j , our formal proof of Theorem 1 only requires continuity of these functions, while our formal proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 and Corollary 1 do not require even that.
Formal Derivation
We are now ready to formally present our analysis. Full proofs of all the results of this section and of Section 4 are given in Appendix A.
Communicating-Vessel Equalization
Let S be the set of first pistons to stop during the process depicted in Fig. 2 . Assume that when these pistons stop, the total amount of liquid in the respective containers is µ. At what height did the pistons stop? In this section we formalize the answer to this question.
Definition 7 (Communicating-Vessel Equalization). Let m ∈ N and let f 1 , . . . , f m : R ≥ → R ∪ {undefined} be nondecreasing functions. We define the function Equalize f 1 ,...,fm :
For f 1 , . . . , f m : R ≥ → R, one may intuitively think of Equalize f 1 ,...,fm (µ) as exactly the answer to the question raised above: If f 1 , . . . , f m are the functions corresponding (see Fig. 3 ) to the containers of the first pistons to stop during the process depicted in Fig. 2 , and if total amount of liquid in the respective containers when these pistons stop is µ, then Equalize f 1 ,...,fm (µ) is the height in which these pistons stop; Equalize f 1 ,...,fm (µ) = undefined if it is impossible that all these pistons simultaneously stop when the total amount of liquid in these containers is µ. Alternatively and equivalently, if empty containers corresponding (see Fig. 3 ) to f 1 , . . . , f m are connected at their base and the resulting system of communicating vessels is jointly filled with µ liquid, then Equalize f 1 ,...,fm (µ) is the resulting liquid surface level; see Fig. 4 for an illustration. When two of the functions f 1 , . . . , f m share a plateau height (cf. Corollary 1(2)), then the liquid distribution µ 1 , . . . , µ m may not be well defined; see Fig. 5 for an illustration. Nonetheless, we now show that the resulting surface level Equalize f 1 ,...,fm is well defined, i.e. independent of the chosen liquid distribution µ 1 , . . . , µ m .
Lemma 1 (Equalization is Well Defined and Nondecreasing). Let m ∈ N and let f 1 , . . . , f m : R ≥ → R ∪ {undefined} be nondecreasing functions. Equalize f 1 ,...,fm is a well-defined nondecreasing function.
The following corollary notes that "connecting a single vessel with itself" has no effect, while connecting m > 1 vessels may be done by first connecting subsets of these vessels into "intermediate vessels", and only then connecting all "intermediate vessels" together; it is for the sake of the latter that we have allowed the functions f 1 , . . . , f m in Definition 7 to assume the value undefined.
Corollary 2. Let m ∈ N and let f 1 , . . . , f m : R ≥ → R∪{undefined} be nondecreasing functions.
Figure 5: Equalization of two copies of the function from Fig. 3(f) , via two distinct liquid distributions. Formally, when µ > 2d, then there exists a continuum of pairs µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ R ≥ s.t. µ 1 + µ 2 = µ and min{µ 1 , d} = min{µ 2 , d}.
The attentive reader may have noticed that Theorem 1 requires continuity of f 1 , . . . , f n . Indeed, if even one of these functions is discontinuous, then an (even-not-necessarily-strong) Nash equilibrium may not necessarily exist; see Fig. 6 for an illustration. We therefore now turn our attention to equalization of continuous functions.
• We say that f is continuous
• We say that f is defined on a suffix of
Lemma 2 (Equalization of Continuous Functions). Let m ∈ N and let f 1 , . . . , f m : R ≥ → R ∪ {undefined} be nondecreasing functions.
1. If at least one of f 1 , . . . , f m is continuous, then Equalize f 1 ,...,fm is continuous.
2. If each of f 1 , . . . , f m is continuous and defined on a suffix of R ≥ , then Equalize f 1 ,...,fm is continuous and defined on a suffix of R ≥ as well.
The following corollary shows that for continuous real functions, the only "reason" for their equalization to be undefined is of the type depicted in Fig. 4(b) , i.e. an uneven bottom of the corresponding containers.
Corollary 3. Let m ∈ N and let f 1 , . . . , f m : R ≥ → R be nondecreasing continuous real func-
Highest-Stopping Pistons and their Height
Following Observation 1 from Section 5, we expect the set of pistons stopping first to be P G , and expect them to stop at height h G , for P G and h G that we now define using the machinery developed in the previous section.
be a resource selection game. We define:
=∅ .
•
• P G arg Max
• h G Max
• We show below that in the cases that we study (i.e. when G has a Nash equilibrium or when f 1 , . . . , f n are continuous), P G is the maximum of arg Max S∈D G E G (S), and so h G = E G (P G ). Furthermore, we show that in these cases h G = Max S∈2
[n] =∅ E G (S), where the value undefined is treated as −∞ for comparisons by the Max operator, i.e. D G may be replaced with 2
=∅ in the definition of h G .
• If f 1 , . . . , f n are all (strictly) increasing, then
where the value undefined is treated as −∞ for comparisons by the Max operator. I.e. D G may be replaced with 2
=∅ in the definition of P G as well. To see that these two sides in general (i.e. when not all f 1 , . . . , f n are increasing) do not necessarily coincide, consider the game n = 2,
Lemma 3. In every resource selection game G, P G = ∅, and h G ∈ R is well defined.
Uniqueness and Strength
At the heart of our proof of Theorem 2 lies the Lemma 4, formalizing Observations 1 and 3 to 5 from Section 5. We note that unlike Theorem 1, neither Lemma 4 nor Theorem 2 require the continuity of f 1 , . . . , f n .
Lemma 4 (Uniqueness of Highest-Stopping Pistons and their Height). Let s be a Nash equilibrium in a resource selection game
, and let P s arg Max j∈[n] h s j .
=∅ \ 2 P s =∅ and j ∈ P s .
For every
. Furthermore,
• As mentioned in Remark 3, if f 1 , . . . , f n are all (strictly) increasing, then
where the value undefined is treated as −∞ for comparisons by the Max operator; i.e. D G may be replaced with 2
=∅ in the definition of P G . To see that Part 1 does not necessarily hold when so defining P G (when not all f 1 , . . . , f m are increasing), consider once again the game n = 2, f 1 = id, f 2 (x) = min{x, 2}, µ {1} = 1, µ {2} = 3 and µ {1,2} = 0 from Remark 3. In this game, consumption of each player type {i} solely from resource i is the unique consumption profile and hence the unique Nash equilibrium -denote it by s. Note that h s 1 = 1 and h s 2 = 2, and so
• The r.h.s. of both Lemma 4(1) (both as is and when simplified for increasing functions) and Lemma 4(2), and therefore also the quantifications in Lemma 4(2) and Lemma 4(3), are independent of the choice of s.
The proof of Theorem 2 using Lemma 4 is given in Appendix A.2. This proof effectively follows Algorithm 1 -a succinct algorithm (based upon Lemma 4), which, if any Nash equilibrium exists, directly and explicitly calculates h s j for all j in every Nash equilibrium s (without the need to first calculate players' strategies, which are dependent on s).
Full proofs of Corollary 1 and Theorem 3 are given in Appendix A.2. The former is based on Theorem 2 as explained above, and the latter -on the analysis of Lemma 4, following and formalizing an extension of Observation 2 from Section 5. We conclude this section by demonstrating that, as suggested by the manner Theorem 3 is stated, a Nash equilibrium is not necessarily super strong when the condition of Part 2 of this theorem (regarding the plateau heights of f 1 , . . . , f n ) is not met. Indeed, consider the resource selection game in which n = 2, f 1 = id, f 2 (x) = min{x, 3}, µ {1} = 1, µ {2} = 2 and µ {1,2} = 3. In this game, a (strong)
Algorithm 1 Direct computation of h s j for all j ∈ [n], regardless of the choice of Nash equilibrium s.
// M is the set of pistons still in motion.
3:
4:
// By Lemma 4(4), the pistons P that stop next are those that stop first in the 6:
// By Lemma 4(1).
8:
// h is the height at which the pistons P stop.
9:
h ← h (fj )j∈M ;(
10:
for j ∈ P do 11:
end for 13:
end while
15:
return (h 1 , . . . , h n ) 16: end procedure Nash equilibrium is given by {1} → (1, 0), {2} → (0, 2), {1, 2} → (2, 1). Nonetheless, this Nash equilibrium is not super strong, since the coalition of players with types {1}, {1, 2} can deviate with {1} → (1, 0) (no change) and {1, 2} → (0, 3), from which players of type {1, 2} are unharmed, while players of type {1} benefit.
Existence
We move on to proving the existence of a Nash equilibrium. A full proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A.2. This proof formalizes Observations 1 and 2 from Section 5, effectively following the construction of Fig. 2 and showing that in each step, the pistons stopping are those computed in Algorithm 1. This is done using the following lemma, constructively showing, even in the absence of prior knowledge of an existence of a Nash equilibrium, that in each iteration of the algorithm, the liquid that by Lemma 4(3) should be under the pistons P when they stop can be distributed appropriately among them, and that Algorithm 1 indeed finds the sets P in decreasing order of stopping height.
be a resource selection game s.t. f 1 , . . . , f n are continuous.
(Liquid Distribution under P G ). There exists a consumption profile s in the |P
, where
We once again emphasize that none of the results presented in this paper hinge on any fixed-point theorem, on the Minimax Theorem or any equivalent result, or on the existence of a potential.
ID-Dependent Weighting
We briefly describe an example for an extension of the above results; we conjecture that many other extensions exist as well. For n, k ∈ N, an n-resource/k-player-type resource selection game with ID-dependent weighting is defined by a treble (f j ) n j=1 ; (f i j )
=∅ and µ i ∈ R ≥ for every player type i ∈ [k]. For each player type i ∈ [k], R i specifies the set of resources from which this player type may consume, while µ i is the amount to be consumed by all players of this type. As before, for each resource j ∈ [n], f j is a function from the consumption amount of this resource to the consumption cost per resource unit. The newly-introduced functions f i j indicate the weighting of the consumption of a player i from a resource j (see below).
A consumption (strategy) profile in this game is a function s :
. Given a consumption profile s in this game, we define µ s j k i=1 f i j s j (i) (note the newly-introduced weighting) for every j ∈ [n] -the weighted load on (i.e. total weighted consumption from) resource j. As before, we define h s j f j (µ s j ) for every j ∈ [n]. A Nash equilibrium in this game is a consumption profile s s.t. for every
Example 2 (Computing Jobs). Consider a scenario in which the resources are computer servers, and each player wishes to run a large amount of computing jobs, where jobs corresponding to the same player are of a similar nature. Each player i ∈ [k] may choose between the machines R i , whose hardware is compatible with player i's jobs, and would like for all these jobs to complete as soon as possible given this constraint. µ i in this case is proportional to the amount of jobs of player i, and f i j is a linear function s.t. f i j (x) is proportional to the number of cycles of machine j required to compute x jobs of player i. (The hardware of each machine may run jobs of some nature more efficiently than jobs of another nature, e.g. machine 2 may run image-processing jobs faster than text-analysis ones, while machine 3 may run the latter faster than the former.) For each j ∈ [n], we choose f j s.t. h s j = f j (µ s j ) is proportional to the number of seconds required for µ s j cycles to complete. (Assume that the resources of each machine are parallelized between its different users, so that their jobs all complete at the same time.)
We note that by setting f i j = id for all i, j, we obtain a resource selection game as in the previous sections, and so this is a strict generalization of resource selection games as defined there. Intuitively, the construction from Fig. 2 may be adapted to this generalized framework by inserting "compressors/expanders" into the tubes between balloons corresponding to the same player type. E.g. if µ 1 = {1, 2}, f 1 1 (x) = x and f 1 2 (x) = 2x, then the balloon system corresponding to player type 1 consists of two balloons -one in container 1 and the other in container 2, connected by a compressor/expander tube s.t. for each drop of liquid that enters the tube from the balloon in container 1, two drops exit into the balloon in container 2, and for every two drops of liquid that enter the tube from the balloon in container 2, one drop exits into the balloon in container 1.
The first thing that we note about this generalized game is that it no longer holds that h s j is independent of the choice of a Nash equilibrium s; see Fig. 7 for an illustration. Nonetheless, if we accept the physical intuition that when compressed via pistons, any of the liquid distributions given in Fig. 7 eventually reaches that in Fig. 7(d) , then our construction can be shown to yield a strong (and under the conditions of Theorem 3(2), super-strong) Nash equilibrium, and uniqueness of h s j can still be shown to hold among strong Nash equilibria. Formally, Theorem 3(1) no longer holds w.r.t. the game (f j ) n j=1 ; (f i j )
, while Theorems 1, 2 and 3(2) and
Figure 7: Liquid distributions among balloons, corresponding to a plethora of Nash equilibria s with distinct h s j , when n = 2, k = 2 (blue corresponding to i = 1, and red -to i = 2),
Only the Nash equilibrium depicted in Fig. 7(d) is strong (in fact, it is super strong).
Corollary 1 still hold w.r.t. this game when replacing every occurrence of "Nash" with "strong Nash". The formal analysis leading to these results is conceptually similar to that presented in Section 6.
Further Research
The results of this paper and of Gonczarowski and Tennenholtz (2014) , as well as the earlier results of Kaminsky (2000) and of Fisher, show not only that physical hydraulic systems may be a fruitful source of intuition for proofs regarding equilibria, but furthermore that they may be used to naturally "calculate" a variety of flavours of equilibria. It would be interesting to rigorously define a "hydraulic" calculation, and to study its strength and limitations.
A Proofs and Auxiliary Results

A.1 Proofs of Lemmas and Corollaries from Section 6, and Auxiliary Results
A.1.1 Communicating-Vessel Equalization
We begin with an immediate consequence of Definition 6.
Lemma 6. Let m ∈ N and let f 1 , . . . , f m : R ≥ → R ∪ {undefined} be nondecreasing functions.
Proof of Lemma 1. We start by showing that Equalize f 1 ,...,fm (µ) is well defined for every µ ∈ R ≥ . We have to show that if there exist µ 1 , . . . , µ m ∈ R ≥ s.t. Proof of Corollary 2. Part 1 follows directly by definition, as when m = 1, we always have µ 1 = µ. We move on to proving Part 2; Let k ∈ [m] and 1 ≤ j 1 < j 2 < · · · < j k < m; define j 0 0 and j k+1 m.
If h Equalize f 1 ,...,fm (µ) ∈ R, then there exist µ 1 , . . . , µ m ∈ R ≥ s.t.
,...,Equalize f j k +1 ,...,fm (µ), as required.
Proof of Lemma 2. By Corollary 2, when proving either part it is enough to consider the case in which m = 2. (The case m = 1 follows from Corollary 2(1), while the case m > 2 follows from the case m = 2 by iteratively applying Corollary 2(2).)
We start by proving Part 1. Let µ ∈ R ≥ s.t. h Equalize f 1 ,f 2 (µ) ∈ R and let ε > 0; assume w.l.o.g. that f 1 is continuous. By definition of h, there exists µ 1 ∈ [0, µ] s.t. f 1 (µ 1 ) = f 2 (µ−µ 1 ) = h. By continuity of f 1 , there exists δ > 0 s.t. |f 1 (µ ′ )−h| < ε for every µ ′ ∈ (µ−δ, µ+δ)∩f
. If h ′ = h, then we trivially have |h ′ − h| = 0 < ε, as required; assume, therefore, that h ′ = h. We show that µ ′ 1 ∈ (µ 1 − δ, µ 1 + δ) by considering two cases. If h ′ > h, then as f 1 , f 2 are nondecreasing and as
in this case as well. By definition of δ and as f 1 (µ ′ ) = h ′ ∈ R, we obtain |h ′ − h| = |f 1 (µ ′ ) − h| < ε, as required.
We move on to proving Part 2. By Part 1, Equalize f 1 ,f 2 is continuous; it is therefore left to show that Equalize f 1 ,f 2 is defined on a suffix of R ≥ . Recall that for every µ ∈ R, by definition Equalize
as required. Proof of Corollary 3. By Lemma 2(2), Equalize f 1 ,...,fm is a real function iff Equalize f 1 ,...,fm (0) ∈ R, which by definition holds iff f 1 (0) = f 2 (0) = · · · = f m (0).
A.1.2 Highest-Stopping Pistons and their Height
Proof of Lemma 3. By definition, S / ∈ M G (S) for every S ∈ 2
=∅ (by taking µ
Therefore, M G {1} = ∅; furthermore, by Corollary 2(1),
In particular, we have that D G = ∅, and so, by finiteness of D G , we have that P G = ∅ and that h G ∈ R is well defined.
A.1.3 Uniqueness and Strength
Proof of Lemma 4. We start by proving Part 3. Let R ∈ 2
[n] =∅ s.t. there exists j ∈ P s s.t. s j (R) > 0; it is enough to show that R ∈ 2 P s =∅ . By definition of s, h s j ≤ h s k for every k ∈ R, and as h s j = Max i∈[n] h s i ≥ h s k , we have h s k = h s j and so k ∈ P s for every k ∈ R. Therefore, R ∈ 2 P s =∅ as required. We move on to prove Part 4. We first show that s ′ is a consumption profile in the game
. By definition of s ′ , we have that
where the penultimate equality is by Part 3. We move on to show that h s j = h s ′ j for every j ∈ [n]\P s . By definition of s ′ , we have for every
[n] =∅ s j (R) = µ s j (where the penultimate equality is since j / ∈ R for every R ∈ 2 P s =∅ ), and hence h s ′ j = f j (µ s ′ j ) = f j (µ s j ) = h s j , as required. We conclude by showing s ′ is indeed a Nash equilibrium in G ′ . Let R ′ ∈ 2
[n]\P s =∅ , and let k ∈ supp s ′ (R ′ ) and j ∈ R ′ . As 0 < s ′ k (R ′ ) = R∈O(R ′ ) s k (R), we have that there exists
and so s ′ is a Nash equilibrium in G ′ , as required. Before moving on to prove Parts 1 and 2, we prove a few auxiliary results. We first show that ∀j ∈ P s : h
By definition of P s , f j (µ s j ) = h s j = h s k = f k (µ s k ) for every j, k ∈ P s . Therefore, h s j = Equalize f k :k∈P s k∈P s µ s k for every j ∈ P s . It is therefore enough to show that k∈P s µ s k =
where the penultimate equality is by Part 3, and the last equality is since s(R) ∈ µ R · ∆ R ⊆ µ R · ∆ P s for every R ∈ 2 P s =∅ . Next, we show that for every S ∈ 2
k∈S µ s k and so, by Lemma 6(1), there exists k ∈ S s.t.
We now show that P s ∈ arg Max S∈2
[n] =∅ E G (S), where the value undefined is treated as −∞ for comparisons by the Max operator. Let S ∈ 2
. Therefore, by Eq. (1) and by definition of P s we obtain that
, and so indeed P s ∈ arg Max S∈2
Finally, we show that M G (P s ) = ∅. We have to show that for every S ∈ 2 P s =∅ there exists µ ≤ R∈2 P s
=∅
\2
P s \S =∅ µ R s.t. Equalize f k :k∈S (µ) = E G (P s ). Let, therefore, S ∈ 2 P s =∅ and define µ j∈S µ s j . By Eq.
(1) and by definition of P s , it is enough to show that both Equalize f k :k∈S (µ) = Max j∈[n] h s j and µ ≤ R∈2 P s
h s j for every k ∈ S, and so, by definition, Equalize f k :k∈S (µ) = Equalize f k :k∈S ( j∈S µ s j ) = Max j∈[n] h s j . For every j ∈ S, we have µ s j = R∈2
, where the penultimate equality is by Part 3 since j ∈ S ⊆ P s , and the last inequality is since j / ∈ R for every R ∈ 2
µ R , as required, and so M G (P s ) = ∅.
We now move on to proving Part 1; we do so by showing mutual containment between the two sides of the equality.
⊆: It is enough to show that P s ∈ arg Max S∈D G E G (S). As M G (P s ) = ∅ and as by Eq. (1)
⊇: We must show that S ⊆ P s for every S ∈ arg Max S ′′ ∈D G E G (S ′′ ). Define S ′ S \P s ∈ 2 S and assume for contradiction that S ′ = ∅. It is enough to show that Equalize
Recall from the proof of the other direction ("⊆") that P s ∈ arg Max S ′′ ∈D G E G (S ′′ ); therefore, by definition of S, by Eq. (1) and by definition of P s , we obtain that E G (S) = E G (P s ) = Max k∈ [n] [n] h s k for every j ∈ S \ S ′ ; ergo, s j (R) = 0 for every j ∈ S \ S ′ and R ∈ 2 S =∅ \ 2
Therefore, by Lemma 6(1) there exists j ∈ S ′ s.t. f j (µ s j ) ≥ Equalize f k :k∈S ′ (µ), and thus Equalize
We conclude by proving Part 2. Recall from the proof of the first direction (⊆) of Part 1 that E G (P s ) = Max S∈D G E G (S). Therefore, by Eq. (1), h s j = E G (P s ) = Max S∈D G E G (S) = h G for every j ∈ P s , as required.
A.1.4 Constrained Distribution
Before moving on to prove Lemma 5, we first formulate and prove a combinatorial result that we use in the proof of this lemma.
Definition 10 (Distribution Constraint).
=∅ , and t j ≤ T j ∈ R ≥ for every j ∈ [n].
We say that a distribution constraint
=∅ and R∈2
j∈S t j and T C (S) j∈S T j . We say that C is normal if both t C (S) ≤ M C (S) and m C (S) ≤ T C (S) for every S ∈ 2
[n] =∅ . We note that it is trivial to show that every satisfiable distribution constraint is normal. In this section, we constructively show (without the use of e.g. linear programming) that the other direction holds as well, and give a procedure for explicitly finding a solution to (i.e. a witness to the satisfiability of) any given normal distribution:
Lemma 7. Every normal distribution constraint is satisfiable.
Before proving Lemma 7, we first develop some machinery.
(The other side of the inequality follows from normality of C.)
For every S, S ′ ∈ 2
, as required. (Once again, the other side of the inequality follows from normality of C.)
Lemma 9 (Moving Mass from R to {n}).
2. If t n > µ {n} , then there exists R ∈ 2
4. If C ′ is satisfiable, then C is satisfiable.
Remark 5. The condition of Lemma 9(3) is actually also necessary, i.e. C ′ is normal iff µ ≤ Q R C . Proof of Lemma 9. Part 1 follows directly from the fact that C is normal, and so M C (S) − t C (S) ≥ 0 and T C (S) − m C (S) ≥ 0 for every S ∈ 2
[n] =∅ . To prove Part 2, let S 1 S ∈ 2
has any effect only if [n] is the sole element in the intersection defining S 2 ). We first show that there exists R ⊆ S 2 \ S 1 s.t. {n} R and µ R > 0.
For ease of notation, we extend the definition of m C (S), M C (S), t C (S) and T C (S) also to the case S = ∅, via the same definition; we note that these all equal zero when S = ∅, as they are all defined by empty sums in this case. We note that if S 1 = ∅, then M C (S 1 ) = t C (S 1 ) by Lemma 8(1), and if
We first consider the case in which S 2 = [n]. In this case, by Lemma 8(2),
. Hence, and as T n ≥ t n > µ {n} , we have that
Therefore, R∈2
S 2 \S =∅ :{n} R µ R > 0, and so there exists R ⊆ S 2 \ S = S 2 \ S 1 s.t. {n} R and µ R > 0, as required.
We now consider the case in which S
2 = [n]. Note that M C S 1 ∪ {n} ≥ t C S 1 ∪ {n} = t C (S 1 ) + t n = M C (S 1 ) + t n > M C (S 1 ) + µ {n} = M C S 1 ∪ {n} − R∈2 [n]\S 1 =∅ :{n} R µ R ; therefore,
R∈2
[n]\S 1 =∅ :{n} R µ R > 0, and so there exists R ⊆ [n] \ S 1 = S 2 \ S 1 s.t. {n} R and µ R > 0, as required.
Either way, there exists R ⊆ S 2 \S 1 s.t. {n} R and µ R > 0. Therefore, for every S ∈ 2
[n−1] =∅ s.t. S ∩ R = ∅, we have S ⊆ S 1 and so M C (S) = t C (S) and by normality of C, M C (S) > t C (S); for every S ∈ 2
=∅ s.t. n ∈ S and R ⊆ S, we have S 2 ⊆ S and so T C (S) = m C (S) and by normality of C, T C (S) > m C (S). By both of these, Q R C > 0 and the proof of Part 2 is complete. We move on to Part 3; let S ∈ 2
=∅ . If R ⊆ S (and so also n ∈ S) or both R ⊆ S and n / ∈ S, then by normality of C,
otherwise, R ⊆ S and n ∈ S, and by definition of µ and of Q R C ,
If S ∩ R = ∅ (and so also n / ∈ S) or both S ∩ R = ∅ and n ∈ S, then by normality of C,
otherwise, S ∩ R = ∅ and n / ∈ S, and by definition of µ and of Q R C ,
Therefore, C ′ is normal. For every S ∈ 2
[n] =∅ s.t. R ⊆ S and n ∈ S, we have that m C ′ (S) = m C (S) + µ. Therefore,
For every S ∈ 2
[n−1] =∅ , we have M C ′ (S) ∈ M C (S), M C (S) − µ (as shown above, depending on whether or not both S ∩ R = ∅ and n / ∈ S); for every S ∈ 2
[n] =∅ s.t. n ∈ S, we have that m C ′ (S) ∈ m C (S), m C (S) + µ (as shown above, depending on whether or not both R ⊆ S and n ∈ S). Therefore, for every R ′ ∈ 2
Therefore, the proof of Part 3 is complete.
We conclude by proving Part 4. As C ′ is satisfiable, by definition there exist (µ ′R ′ j )
, and the proof is complete.
Lemma 10 (Distributing All Mass but
be a normal distribution constraint s.t. µ {n} ≥ t n . We say that condition
=∅ s.t. {n} R and µ R > 0, then condition D C holds.
For every R ∈ 2
4. If C ′ is satisfiable, the C is satisfiable.
Remark 6. Once again, the condition of Lemma 10(3) is actually also necessary, i.e. C ′ is normal iff condition D C holds.
Proof of Lemma 10. Part 1 holds as for every S ∈ 2
To prove Part 2, define S 1 and S 2 as in the proof of Lemma 9(2); as in that proof, it suffices to show that if condition D C does not hold, then there exists R ⊆ S 2 \ S 1 s.t. {n} R and µ R > 0. As in that proof, we extend the definition of m C (S), M C (S), t C (S) and T C (S) also to the case S = ∅. By Part 1, T n > µ {n} . If S 2 = [n], then the proof follows as in the proof of Lemma 9(2) (as that proof only uses the fact that µ {n} < T n when S 2 = [n], and does not rely on the inequality µ {n} < t n for this case). It therefore remains to consider the case in which
Recall that if S 1 = ∅, then M C (S 1 ) = t C (S 1 ) by Lemma 8(1), and if S 1 = ∅, then M C (S 1 ) = 0 = t C (S 1 ) by definition. As condition D C does not hold, there exists S ∈ 2
:{n} R µ R > 0, and so there exists R ⊆ (S ∪ {n}) \ S ′ ⊆ S 2 \ S 1 s.t. {n} R and µ R > 0, as required, and the proof of Part 2 is complete.
We move on to Part 3. For every S ∈ 2
=∅ , as condition D C holds,
furthermore,
Therefore, C ′ is normal, as required.
We conclude by proving Part 4. As C ′ is satisfiable, by definition there exist (µ ′R j )
For every R ∈ 2 For every R ∈ 2
by normality of C) and the proof is complete.
be a normal distribution constraint. We prove the claim by induction on n ∈ N.
(Outer induction) Base: For n = 1, we have by definition that m C {1} = µ {1} = M C {1} , and so
µ {1} completes the proof of the (outer) induction base. (Outer induction) Step: Let n > 1 and assume that the lemma holds for n − 1. We prove the induction step by full induction on R ∈ 2
, then by Lemma 9(2), t n ≤ µ {n} , and by Lemma 10(2), condition D C holds. Therefore, by Lemma 10(3), C ′ as defined in Lemma 10 is normal, and by the (outer) induction hypothesis for n − 1, C ′ is satisfiable. By Lemma 10(4), C is satisfiable as well.
(Inner induction)
Step: Assume that R ∈ 2
[n] =∅ {n} R & µ R > 0 & Q R C > 0 > 0 and that the claim holds whenever this set is of smaller cardinality. Therefore, there exists R ∈ 2
[n] =∅ s.t. {n} R, µ R > 0 and Q R C > 0; let µ min{Q R C , µ R } > 0, and define C ′ w.r.t. R and µ as in Lemma 9. By Lemma 9(3), C ′ is normal. If µ = µ R , then µ ′R = 0; otherwise, µ = Q R C and by Lemma 9(3), Q R C ′ = Q R C − µ = 0. Either way, and by definition of C ′ and as by Lemma 9(3) Q R ′ C ′ = 0 whenever Q R ′ C = 0, we have that R ′ ∈ 2
and so, by the (inner) induction hypothesis, C ′ is satisfiable. By Lemma 9(4), C is satisfiable as well and the proof is complete.
A.1.5 Existence
In both parts, the value undefined is treated as −∞ for comparisons by the Max operator.
Proof. To show Part 1, note that by Corollary 2(1), E G {1} = Equalize f 1 (µ {1} ) = f 1 µ {1} ∈ R; therefore, E G ({1}) ∈ R, and so Max S∈2
[n] =∅ E G (S) ∈ R, as required.
Define A arg Max S∈2 
By Part 1, E G (S) ∈ R, and so by definition there exist (
therefore, by continuity of (f k ) k∈S\M ′ and by Lemma 2(2), we obtain that also Equalize
, and so indeed S \ M ′ ∈ A, as required. We conclude by proving Part 2. By definition h G ≤ Max S∈2
[n] =∅ E G (S); we therefore have to show that h G ≥ Max S∈2
[n] =∅ E G (S). Let S ∈ A. We iteratively define a series (S i ) k i=0 , for k ∈ N to be determined, as follows:
• If M G (S i ) = ∅, then we set k i and conclude. Otherwise, choose M i ∈ M G (S i ) arbitrarily, and set S i+1 S i \ M i .
We now show by induction that S i ∈ A and |S i | ≤ |S| − i for every i for which S i is defined.
• Base: By definition, S 0 = S ∈ A and |S 0 | ≤ |S 0 | − 0 = |S| − 0, as required.
Step: Let i > 0 for which S i is defined. By the induction hypothesis, S i−1 ∈ A; therefore, as shown above and by continuity of (f j ) j∈S i−1 \M i−1 , we have that
Furthermore, as by definition M i−1 = ∅, we have by the induction hypothesis that
We conclude that the process constructing (S i ) i indeed stops (i.e. k is well defined), and with k < |S|. By definition, M G (S k ) = ∅, and as S k ∈ A, by Part 1 we have
We note that it can be shown that, in the context of Lemma 11(2), for every S ∈ A s.t.
While this may be used to avoid the inductive construction concluding the proof of this lemma, the need to prove these facts would result in a considerably longer total length for the proof.
be a resource selection game s.t. f 1 , . . . , f n are continuous. For every S ∈ arg Max S ′ ∈D G E G (S ′ ), there exists a strategy profile s in the |S|-
Proof. For every j ∈ S, let t j min f
µ R otherwise (t j and T j are well defined by continuity of f j and since E G (S) = h G ); regardless of how we define T j , we have that both f j (T j ) = h G and T j ≥ t j (when sup f −1 j (h G ) = ∞, this is since E G (S) = h G and since f j is nondecreasing). We now show that
(See Appendix A.1.4; we slightly abuse notation by treating S in the context of C as |S| , using an arbitrary isomorphism.) Let
By continuity of (f j ) j∈S ′ and by Lemma 2(2), we thus have that
[n] =∅ E G (S ′′ ) (where the last equality is by Lemma 11(2)) -a
As C is normal, by Lemma 7 it is satisfiable, and so there exist s j (R)
By the former, s is a strategy profile in G ′ , and by the latter, for every j ∈ S we have that µ s j ∈ [t j , T j ], and so by definition of t j and T j and since f j is nondecreasing, h s j = f j (µ s j ) = h G and the proof is complete.
be a resource selection game. If
Proof. Define A arg Max S∈D G E G (S). By Lemma 3, A = ∅. Therefore, by definition of P G , it is enough to show that S ′ ∪ S ′′ ∈ A for every S ′ , S ′′ ∈ A. Let, therefore, S ′ , S ′′ ∈ A; it is enough to show that S ′ ∪ S ′′ ∈ D G and that E G (S ′ ∪ S ′′ ) = h G . By Lemma 12, there exists a strategy profile s ′ in the game (f j ) j∈S ′ ; (µ R ) R∈2 S ′ =∅ s.t. h s ′ j = h G for every j ∈ S ′ ; similarly, there exists a strategy profile s ′′ in the game (f j ) j∈S ′′ ; (µ R ) R∈2 S ′′ =∅ s.t. h s ′′ j = h G for every j ∈ S ′′ . For every R ∈ 2 S ′ =∅ , we define s(R) s ′ (R) and setμ R µ R ;
for every R ∈ 2 S ′′ =∅ \ 2 S ′ =∅ , we define s j (R) s ′′ j (R) for every j ∈ S ′′ \ S ′ and s j (R) 0 for every j ∈ S ′ ∩ S ′′ and setμ
0 and setμ R 0. By definition, s is a consumption profile in the game
For every j ∈ S ′ , by definition of s we have µ s j = µ s ′ j and so
we have by continuity of (f k ) k∈S ′ ∪S ′′ , by Lemma 3 and by
µ R , and the proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma 5. Part 1 follows directly from Lemmas 12 and 13. We therefore prove Part 2. Assume for contradiction that h G ′ ≥ h G ; recall that by definition P G ′ ⊆ [n] \ P G and so P G ′ and P G are disjoint. As by Lemma 3, P G ′ = ∅, we aim to obtain a contradiction by showing that
Similarly, by Lemma 13, P G ′ ∈ arg Max S∈D G ′ E G ′ (S); therefore, and by definition of G ′ , we have that
As f j is nondecreasing, by Corollary 2(1) and by definition of h G , we have f j (0) ≤ f j (µ {j} ) = E G ({j}) ≤ h G . By continuity of f j and by the intermediate value theorem, there thus exists
Therefore, by definition of P G , in order to show that P G ′ ⊆ P G and complete the proof, it is enough to show that
. By Lemma 13, M G (P G ) = ∅ and so, if S ∩ P G = ∅, then there exists
Similarly, by Lemma 13,
for every j ∈ P G ′ , we also have in this case that Equalize f k :k∈S∩P G ′ j∈S∩P G ′ µ j = h G . By both of these and by Lemma 1, Equalize
By definition of µ (and by Corollary 2(2) if neither
µ R in order to complete the proof. Indeed, since P G and P G ′ are disjoint, we obtain that
A.2 Proof of the Theorems and Corollary from Section 4
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove by full induction on n that in every n-resource selection game
. . , f n are continuous, there exists a Nash equilibrium s s.t.
Max j∈[n] h s j ≤ h G ; from this claim, the theorem a fortiori follows. Let n ∈ N and assume that this claim holds for all smaller natural values of n.
be an n-resource selection game. By Lemma 5(1), there exists a strategy profile s ′′ in the
By definition of Nash equilibrium, s ′′ is a Nash equilibrium in G ′′ . If P G = [n], then s s ′′ is a Nash equilibrium as required, and the proof of the induction step is complete. Assume, therefore, that P G [n]; hence, and since P G = ∅ by Lemma 3, by the induction hypothesis there exists a Nash equilibrium s ′ in the
We construct a strategy profile s in G as follows: s(R) s ′′ (R) for every R ∈ 2 P G =∅ , and for every R ′ ∈ 2
. This is a well-defined strategy profile in G
, and by definition of the player mass in G ′ and G ′′ . By definition of s, we have that h s j = h s ′′ j for every j ∈ P G and h s j = h s ′ j for every j ∈ [n] \ P G . Therefore, by definition of s ′′ we have that h s j = h s ′′ j = h G for every j ∈ P G , and by definition of s ′ and by Lemma 5(2), we have that h s j = h s ′ j ≤ h G ′ < h G for every j ∈ [n] \ P G . Therefore, we have that h s j ≤ h G for every j ∈ [n]. We complete the proof by showing that s is a Nash equilibrium in G. For every R ∈ 2 P G =∅ , k ∈ supp s(R) ⊆ R and j ∈ R, we have by definition of s, s ′′ that h s k = h s ′′ k = h G = h s ′′ j = h s j . Let R ∈ 2
=∅ \ 2 P G =∅ , k ∈ supp s(R) and j ∈ R. By definition of s, we have that k ∈ supp s ′ (R \ P G ) ⊆ 2
[n]\P G =∅ . If j ∈ [n] \ P G , then j ∈ R \ P G and by definition of s, s ′ we have that h s k = h s ′ k ≤ h s ′ j = h s j ; otherwise, i.e. if j ∈ P G , then by Lemma 5(2) and by definition of s, s ′ , s ′′ we have that h s k = h s ′ k ≤ h ′ G < h G = h s ′′ j = h s j . Either way, h s k ≤ h s j and the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove the theorem by full induction on n.
Let n ∈ N and assume that the theorem holds for all smaller natural values of n. Let G = (f j ) n j=1 ; (µ R ) R∈2
[n] =∅ be an n-resource selection game and let s, s ′ be Nash equilibria in G.
By Lemma 4(1,2), h s j = h G = h s ′ j , for every j ∈ P G . If P G = [n], then the proof is complete. Otherwise, let s ′′ , s ′′′ : 2
[n]\P G =∅ → R
[n]\P G ≥ be the functions defined by s ′′ j (R ′ ) R∈O(R ′ ) s j (R) and s ′′′ j (R ′ ) R∈O(R ′ ) s ′ j (R) for every j ∈ [n] \ P G (where O(R ′ ) is defined as in Lemma 4(4)). By Lemma 4(1,4), s ′′ , s ′′′ are both Nash equilibria in (f j ) j∈[n]\P G ; R∈O(R ′ ) µ R R ′ ∈2
[n]\P G =∅ , and so, by the induction hypothesis (since P G = ∅ by Lemma 3), we obtain that h s ′′ j = h s ′′′ j for every j ∈ [n] \ P G . Therefore, by Lemma 4(1,4), we have h s j = h s ′′ j = h s ′′′ j = h s ′ j for every j ∈ [n] \ P G as well, and so h s j = h s ′ j for every j ∈ [n], as required.
Proof of Corollary 1. We start by proving Part 1. Let s, s ′ be Nash equilibria in G, and let R ∈ 2
=∅ . By definition of Nash equilibrium and by Theorem 2, we have for every k ∈ supp s(R) and k ′ ∈ supp s ′ (R) that h s k = min j∈R h s j = min j∈R h s ′ j = h s ′ k ′ , as required. We move on to prove Part 2; Let j ∈ [n]. Let S = k ∈ [n] h s k = h s j }; by Theorem 2,
[n] =∅ supp s(R) ⊆ S ; by Theorem 2 and Part 1, R = R ∈ 2
[n] =∅ supp s ′ (R) ⊆ S as well. Assume w.l.o.g. that h s j is not a plateau height of any of S \ {j}; we therefore have to show that µ s k = µ s ′ k for every k ∈ S. For every k ∈ S \ {j}, as h s j is not a plateau height of f k , there exists a unique value µ k ∈ R ≥ s.t. f k (µ k ) = h s j . Therefore, and as by definition of S and by Theorem 2 we have that
for every k ∈ S \ {j}, we have that µ s k = µ k = µ s ′ k for every k ∈ S \ {j}. By Part 1, we have that k∈S µ s k = R∈R µ R = k∈S µ s ′ k , and so µ s j = R∈R µ R − k∈S\{j} µ s k = R∈R µ R − k∈S\{j} µ s ′ k = µ s ′ j . Therefore, µ s k = µ s ′ k for every k ∈ S and the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 3. We begin by proving Part 1 by full induction on n. Let n ∈ N and assume that the claim holds for all smaller natural values of n. Let G = (f j ) n j=1 ; (µ R ) R∈2
[n] =∅ be an n-resource selection game and let s be Nash equilibrium in G. For every R ∈ 2
=∅ with µ R = 0, let h R h s j for every j ∈ supp s(R) . Let T ⊆ 2
=∅ be a coalition and s ′ be a consumption profile s.t. s ′ | 2 
\T
and s.t. h s ′ k < h R for every R ∈ T and k ∈ supp s ′ (R) s.t. s ′ k (R) > s k (R). We must show that s ′ = s. We begin by showing that s ′ (R) = s(R) for every R ∈ 2 P s =∅ , for P s as defined in Lemma 4. Assume for contradiction that s ′ (R) = s(R) for some R ∈ 2 P s =∅ ; therefore, R ∈ T . Let S = {j ∈ P s | h s ′ j < h G } ⊆ P s . As s ′ (R) = s(R), there exists k ∈ R s.t. s ′ k (R) > s k (R) and so k ∈ supp s ′ (R) . Therefore, by definition of s ′ and by Lemma 4(2), we have that h s ′ k < h s k = h G and so k ∈ S; in particular, S = ∅.
For every j ∈ S, by definition of S and by Lemma 4(2), we have that f j (µ s ′ j ) = h s ′ j < h G = h s j = f j (µ s j ); therefore, as f j is nondecreasing we have that µ s ′ j < µ s j for every such j. =∅ s.t. s ′ j (R ′ ) > s j (R ′ ). Therefore, R ′ ∈ T , however, by definition of S and as f j is nondecreasing, we have that
(as s ′ j (R ′ ) > 0, h R ′ is well defined), even though s ′ j (R ′ ) > s j (R ′ ) -a contradiction. Therefore, s ′ (R) = s(R) for every R ∈ 2 P s =∅ and so we may assume w.l.o.g. that T ∩ 2 P s =∅ = ∅. By definition of s ′ , by definition of P s and by Lemma 4(3), we thus obtain that s ′ j ≡ s j for every j ∈ P s . If P s = [n], then the proof is complete. Otherwise, define s ′′ : 2 , by s ′′′ j (R ′ ) R∈O(R ′ ) s ′ j (R) for every j ∈ [n] \ P s . As s ′ j ≡ s j for every j ∈ P s , we have that, similarly to the proof of Lemma 4(4), s ′′′ is a strategy profile in G ′ and h s ′′′ j = h s ′ j for every j ∈ [n] \ P s . Define T ′ {R \ P s | R ∈ T } ∈ 2
[n]\P s =∅
. By definition of T ′ , we have that s ′′′ | 2
[n]\P s =∅ \T ′ = s ′′ | 2
[n]\P s =∅ \T ′ and that h s ′′′ k = h s ′ k < h R = h ′R for every R ′ ∈ T ′ and k ∈ supp s ′′′ (R ′ ) s.t. s ′′′ k (R ′ ) > s ′′ k (R ′ ), where R ∈ O(R ′ ) s.t. k ∈ supp s ′ (R) and s ′ k (R) > s k (R) (there exists such R by definition of R ′ ). By the induction hypothesis (since P s = ∅ by definition), T ′ = ∅, and so T = ∅ and the proof of Part 1 is complete.
The proof of Part 2 is very similar; the main difference is that in Eq. (2) we would have, by h s j not being a plateau height of f j , that h s ′ j = f j (µ s ′ j ) > f j (µ s j ) = h s j = h G ≥ h R ′ . The remaining trivial differences between Parts 1 and 2 are left to the reader.
